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The European seed and pesticide industries have gone through a period of great turmoil in the last 
decade of the twentieth century. Restructuring processes have been thoroughly influenced by the 
developments in plant biotechnology. Also changes in the consumer market for food products and 
changes in government policies have led producers of plant protection products (PPPs) and producers 
of seeds to reconsider their innovation activities. The agrochemical companies are the main drivers 
behind the integration of pesticides, biotechnology, and seeds. 
 
This article analyzes the innovation strategies of the European plant biotechnology industry. 
Innovation is a multidimensional activity. Firm strategies for developing and introducing new 
products and processes are determined by at least three factors: path, position, and process (Teece et 
al., 1997). Path refers to the body of knowledge and experience a firm incorporates, and the path 
dependencies that result from existing knowledge and routines. Position refers to the current products 
a firm sells and the position it has in particular markets. It also refers to the products it wants to sell, 
and the effort needed to establish a position in a new market. Process refers to the organization of 
innovation: to decision-making, information exchange, coordination, and incentive alignment. With 
insight in path, position, and process the main part of innovation strategies of firms can be explained. 
While processes have also been studied in the Policy Influences on Technology for Agriculture 
(PITA) project, this article focuses on positions and paths. 
 
The next section introduces the European companies that have been studied within the PITA project. 
These firms are among the largest in the world in the pesticide industry and the seed industry. The 
third section focuses on the innovation strategies of these companies. The fourth section describes the 
main developments in the environment in which these firms are operating. Both markets for plant 
protection products and seeds, and government policies regulating these markets, are discussed. The 
last section gives conclusions, stressing the uncertainties that European firms in the agricultural 
biotechnology industry continue to face. 
 
Biotechnology, Seeds, And Plant Protection In Europe 
 
Historically, one can distinguish three types of firms that have been developing plant biotechnology 
products: new biotechnology firms (NBFs), agrochemical companies, and seed companies. In plant 
biotechnology only a small number NBFs have been established in Europe.  Most of these firms have 
focused on enabling techniques (e.g., genetic markers) for the development of new plant varieties and 
new PPPs. A notable exception is Plant Genetic Systems (PGS) of Belgium. This small company, 
established in 1983 by researchers from the University of Ghent, has made a major contribution to the 
European plant biotechnology industry. Plant Genetic Systems has developed and acquired major 
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patents for herbicide-tolerant plants, insect-resistant plants, and transgenic hybrid plants. In 1996, 
PGS was acquired by the German agrochemical company AgrEvo. The herbicide for which PGS has 
developed tolerant plants is glufosinate (brand names Basta, Finale, and Liberty), produced by 
AgrEvo— which is now Aventis. The biotechnology products developed by PGS are now marketed 
by Aventis under the names of LibertyLink for herbicide-tolerant crops, StarLink for insect-resistant 
crops (e.g., corn), and SeedLink for transgenic hybrids (e.g., canola). 
 
Producers of plant protection products have been the main private investors in plant biotechnology. 
Already in the 1980s, companies like Sandoz and Ciba Geigy (later merged into Novartis) of 
Switzerland, Shell and ICI/Zeneca of the United Kingdom (UK), Hoechst (later AgrEvo) of Germany, 
and Rhône-Poulenc, and Sanofi of France acknowledged the potentials of biotechnology for their 
innovation activities. Some of these companies have later divested their agrochemical divisions, 
thereby discontinuing plant biotechnology research. Interestingly, some producers of plant protection 
products have only recently invested in biotechnology, like BASF and Bayer in Germany. 
 
European producers of plant protection products are among the largest in the world. In 1998, out of 
the top 10 of global pesticide companies, six were headquartered in Europe. These were all studied in 
the PITA project. After further mergers and acquisitions in 1999 and 2000, the top 10 of the world’s 
largest producers of plant protection products contains seven companies fully dedicated to innovation. 
Four of these companies are European and three are American (table 1). Aventis was formed by the 
December 1999 merger of Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst. Aventis CropScience combines the crop 
protection activities of Rhône-Poulenc Agro and AgrEvo. Syngenta is the result of the October 2000 
merger between Novartis Agribusiness and Zeneca Agrochemicals. BASF has acquired Cyanamid in 
July 2000. Cyanamid was the agrochemical division of American Home Products (United States 
(US)). The seven largest companies now account for 72 percent of the US$ 30 billion (or Euro 32.6 
billion) world pesticide market.1 
 
Restructuring and concentration processes in the agrochemicals industry have been profound. In the 
early 1990s, worldwide there were still ten to fifteen companies with the resources to develop new 
active ingredients. Studying the restructuring process in the first half of the 1990s, Hartnell (1996) 
forecasted that as few as seven major agrochemicals companies would survive past the year 2010. As 
shown by table 1, this number has already been reached in the year 2000. The other three companies 
in the top 10 are mainly generic pesticides producers. 
 
There are several reasons for European producers of plant protection products to invest in 
biotechnology. First, the slow-down in market growth, at least in developed countries, caused firms to 
reconsider their strategies. This slow-down was due to the end of production growth in agriculture 
and to low prices for agricultural products forcing farmers to economize on plant protection. Second, 
societal concern about the negative environmental impact of chemical plant protection products, as 
expressed by strong environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), led to more stringent 
environmental policies. Third, the potential of biotechnology opened new opportunities for 
(integrated) crop protection methods. Thus, market, regulatory, and technology developments  
provided the incentives for the European pesticide industry to look beyond the traditional focus on 
active ingredient development. 
 
Producers of plant protection products investing in biotechnology research realized that the route for 
commercialization of research outcome was through the seed (Kloppenburg, 1988). Full exploitation 
of the commercial opportunities of plant biotechnology research required access to existing and new 
varieties of agricultural and horticultural crops. Thus, seed companies became a major target for 
strategic alliances and acquisitions. 
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Table 1:  World Top 10 Pesticide Producers (2000). 
Company Pesticide Sales
1 
(in Million US$) 
Syngenta (Switzerland)2                                 5,888 
Aventis CropScience (France)                                 3,534 
Monsanto (US)                                 3,531 
Bayer (Germany                                 2,274 
BASF (Germany)3                                 2,248 
Dow AgroSciences (US)                                 2,086 
DuPont (US)                                 2,013 
Sumitomo Chemical (Japan)                                   780 
Makhtesim-Agan (Israel)                                   738 
FMC (US)                                   665 
Note.  1 Sales figures do not include seed sales.  2 Syngenta: proforma sales, excluding divested products.   
3 BASF’s sales include half a year of Cyanamid sales.  From Wood Mackenzie (personal communication,  
April 27, 2001). 
Independently, the European seed industry has also invested in biotechnology, but on a much smaller 
scale than the agrochemical industry. Although seed companies looked upon biotechnology as a 
promising technology for developing new crop varieties, the high cost of biotechnology research and 
development (R&D) led to limited investments. Also the many uncertainties about public acceptance, 
patent positions, and regulation forced seed companies to be reserved. Still, seed companies had 
access to the latest techniques through their relationship with public agricultural research institutes. 
Many government subsidy programs for the development of (applied) biotechnology were explicitly 
designed for the collaboration between seed companies and public research institutes. This was 
particularly the case in France and the Netherlands, and later also in Germany. 
 
The European seed companies in the PITA sample were (in order of size): Novartis (Switzerland), 
Limagrain (France), Advanta (Netherlands), KWS (Germany), AgrEvo (Germany), Cebeco 
(Netherlands) and Danisco (Denmark). Table 2 shows what position these companies (or their 
successors) hold on the top eleven of largest seed companies.2 European companies are less dominant 
in the seed industry than in the pesticide industry. American companies like Pioneer and Monsanto 
have profited from the sheer size of the North American market. The third position of Syngenta is 
also due to its market share on the North American continent. The total seed industry is less 
concentrated than the pesticide industry. Figures on the size of the world commercial seed market 
differ substantially. According to the Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) (2000) the 
world market is 25 billion US$, while industry representatives indicate a total market size of US$ 15 
billion. In the first case, the top 10 companies would have a 30 percent share of the market, while in 
the second case they would be responsible for 50 percent of the market. 
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How European are these companies? The pesticide industry really is a global industry. The costs of 
developing a new compound are so high that a worldwide presence is needed to earn back R&D 
investments. Moreover, given the high costs, new compounds are only developed for the major crops 
in the world, like corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton. Thus, all companies have a position in the main 
production regions for these crops. This is equally valid for European and non-European companies. 
Figure 1 shows that the European market accounts for less than 50 percent of sales for all pesticide 
producers. Zeneca Agrochemicals and Novartis generate more than 70 percent of turnover outside of 
the European market. The recent acquisition of Cyanamid can be explained by the desire of BASF to 
enlarge its position in the North America market (this acquisition is not included in the data of  
figure 1). An interesting difference between the European and the North American pesticide market is 
the relative importance of various products. In Europe, fungicides are relatively more important, 
while in North America herbicides are relatively more important. European companies traditionally 
have a strong position in fungicides, while US companies (particularly Monsanto and DuPont) have a 
bias towards herbicides. As herbicides are by far the largest product group (more than half of the total 
pesticide market), European companies have been expanding in North America to benefit from this 
large herbicide market and to complete their product portfolio.  
 
Table 2:  The Top 11 in the World Seed Industry (1999). 
Company Parent Company/Companies Seed Sales                (in Million US$) 
Pioneer Hi-Bred (US)  DuPont 1,850 
Monsanto (US) Pharmacia 1,700 
Syngenta (Switzerland) Novartis and AstraZeneca                  947 
Limagrain (France) Limigrain cooperative                  700 
Seminis (US) SAVIA/Grupo Pulsar                  531 
Advanta (Netherlands) Cosun and AstraZeneca                  416 
Sakata (Japan) Sakata                  396 
KWS (Germany) KWS                  355 
Dow AgroSciences (US) Dow Chemical                  350 
Delta & Pine Land (US) Delta & Pine Land                  301 
Aventis CropScience (France) Aventis                  288 
Note.  From “The Seed Giant – Who Owns Whom?” (Seed Industry Consolidation Update) by Rural 
Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), 2000. Winnipeg, Canada: RAFI.  Available on the 
World Wide Web: http://www.rafi.org/web/docus/pdfs/masterseed2000.pdf. 
 
Of the specialized seed companies, only Advanta has a substantial presence outside of Europe. 
Zeneca Seeds, one of the two companies that merged into Advanta in 1996, already had a major 
position on the North American market with its subsidiaries Garst and Zeneca Seeds Canada. The 
companies in the right upper corner of figure 1 can be considered as truly European. 
 
Innovation Strategies 
 
The innovation strategies of the European agrochemical and seed companies, as studied in the PITA 
project, show significant diversity. Technological trajectories in the pesticide industry, with its focus 
on scientific research and large-scale industrial production, are quite different from those in the seed 
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industry, which has its background in farming and experience-based innovation. Even within the two 
industries under study, substantial differences occur, due to the history of the company, its product 
portfolio and main markets, and its internal organization. Given that Europe consists of many 
different countries and cultures, nationality has always been important, not only because the domestic 
market affects the kind of products, and the culture of business, but also because of special 
relationships with regulatory agencies. Despite all these difference, similarities within the 
agrochemical industry and within the seed industry do exist. 
 
Traditionally, innovation in the agrochemical industry had a strong focus on finding new active 
ingredients of Plant protection products. This focus on new chemical compounds shares similarities 
with new chemical entity innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Both industries are science 
based, highly R&D intensive and crucially dependent on patent protection.   Innovation in the 
agrochemical industry operates within a framework determined by the interaction of the regulatory 
system (for registering new products), the patenting system (for granting temporary monopolies to 
appropriate the benefits of new products) and market competition (Hartnell, 1996). 
 
Figure 1:  European Share of Company Sales and Main Field of Activity 
Note.  1 Cebeco has a small pesticide subsidiary (Luxan), but it is minor compared to seed.   
2 RPA = Rhône Poulenc Agro. 
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In recent years, other factors have been added to the innovation challenges in the pesticides industry. 
First, plant biotechnology has transformed the knowledge base on which innovation is built. The next 
phase in biotechnology, functional genomics, will generate even more knowledge of the interaction 
between chemicals and the working of plant genes. Second, within the agrifood sector the balance of 
power is shifting from production to consumption, and from quantity to quality. This development 
has greatly broadened the range of stakeholders a producer of plant protection products has to take 
into account. Third, in agriculture and society at large integrated pest management (IPM) has become 
the dominant cognitive frame within which plant protection products have to fit.  
 
Searching for new active ingredients, particularly for so-called “blockbusters,” remains a strong 
focusing device in the agrochemical industry. The imperative to find and develop “champion” 
products is reinforced by the conjuncture of three factors: increasing regulatory costs, slow global 
market growth, and industry consolidation. New strategies for the development of agrochemicals are 
based on spinout technology from the pharmaceutical industry.  These technologies are high 
throughput screening, combinatorial chemistry, and gene mapping of host and pest organisms. The 
creation of new active ingredients as the dominant design of innovation is very much associated with 
the laboratory-based knowledge of organic chemistry and with the related analytical approach of the 
invention. The “one problem - one solution” cognitive frame hardly takes into account systemic 
interactions related to the dynamics of ecosystems.  
 
Although not contradictory, the development of IPM systems appears as a marginal road in the 
technological trajectories, and faces major cognitive and organizational constraints. Moreover, the 
move towards greater use of services (as implied by integrated crop protection) brings forward 
problems of economic pay-off. Farmers are not used to paying for services, and once knowledge has 
been transferred, farmers can continue using it without having to return to the original source. Thus, 
appropriability of research findings is rather difficult once physical products (pesticides) are 
substituted by services (IPM).  Other elements that reinforce path dependency in agricultural pest 
control are uncertainty at the farm level and coordination problems in moving from one system (or 
configuration) to another (Cowan & Gunby, 1996). 
 
Although the seed industry shares the need for long-term investments with the agrochemical industry, 
it has a rather different tradition of innovation processes. Seed firms have traditionally been small-
scale family-owned businesses, operating in close interaction with its farmer-customers. Innovation 
has been mainly incremental, building on existing firm-specific germplasm. Plant breeding is an 
ongoing evolutionary process of creating variation (by making crosses and inducing mutation) and 
making selections. To a large extend, knowledge is embodied in the plant breeder himself, who 
makes the choices in crossing and selection. Once selection choices have been made, it is not easy to 
change the goals of the breeding program. Long term commitment is a basic element of the corporate 
culture of any seed company. In Europe, new varieties ready for commercialization receive protection 
under plant breeders’ rights, which entails a regulatory regime far weaker than patent protection. 
Public research institutes have always played a major role in developing new techniques to be used in 
plant breeding, and for some crops even develop new varieties. Therefore, close interaction has 
always existed between the seed industry and the public agricultural research community.  
 
All seed companies now use certain biotechnology techniques, like molecular markers and cell and 
tissue culture, to speed the development of new varieties, to improve the targeting of specific traits, 
and to enhance research capabilities. The use of genetic engineering to develop genetically modified 
crops generally has been done in association with NBFs, public research institutes, or large 
agrochemical companies. The strategy of introducing genetically modified (GM) crops holds 
significant risks for a seed company. Once a variety has been genetically modified, it cannot be used 
any more for breeding conventional varieties. In a market with great uncertainties, as is currently the 
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situation in Europe, seed companies developing GM varieties also want to maintain conventional 
varieties, which raises R&D costs. 
 
Thus, the new agro-biotechnology trajectory is bringing together the agrochemical industry and the 
seed industries with their different traditions, cultures, and knowledge bases, and different modes of 
interaction with the regulatory environment. This process of integration is creating serious strains in 
both sectors. As shown in other papers in this issue, each company has its own way of dealing with 
these challenges. 
 
The newly formed integrated agrochemical/seed companies are focusing more and more on the crop 
instead of on the pesticide. Biotechnology provides the opportunity to develop integrated solutions of 
pest control, by combining natural resistance embodied in the variety with chemicals sprayed, either 
to directly kill the pest organism or to trigger a pest-resistance mechanism incorporated in the plant. 
Because of the appropriation problem, agrochemicals continue to be important for agrobiotechnology 
firms, but only in combination with some kind of control over variety development and seed 
marketing. 
 
A Changing Market And Policy Environment 
 
Innovation in the European plant biotechnology industry is strongly influenced by government 
regulation. Stringent registration policies affect innovation in the pesticide industry directly, while 
environmental policies targeted at farming affect producers of plant protection products indirectly. 
Seed companies have reacted to environmental policies by putting more emphasis on resistance in the 
mix of breeding goals they pursue. Other forms of regulation affecting innovation in the agrochemical 
and seed industry are intellectual property rights. The shift from plant breeders’ rights to patents 
seems to be more beneficial for agrochemical companies than for seed companies. Currently by far 
the most influential element of government policy for the European agrobiotechnology industry is the 
regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). 
 
The PITA project has focused on the following government policies most relevant for the agbiotech 
industry: policies to stimulate science, technology, and innovation; policies to support farm income, 
including regulation of international trade; and policies to regulate industry and farming in order to 
protect human health and the environment. 
 
European policies in support of science, (bio)technology, and innovation are directly relevant to 
companies’ R&D programs, which rely on the availability of a good supply of well-trained scientists. 
This seems to be a major factor in decision-making on where to locate R&D facilities. While some 
companies emphasized the high quality of biotechnology research at European public research 
institutes, others have set up their main agbiotech research laboratories in the US (notably Novartis). 
 
For high-cost genomics research requiring substantial collaborative efforts, European companies may 
be in a disadvantaged position compared to their US competitors. The balkanization of the European 
research space does not favor EU-wide coordination of public spending. Moreover, the negative 
public attitude has an adverse influence on public support for R&D in plant genomics at the European 
level. 
 
Farm policies are indirectly important for producers of plant protection products and seeds. Short-
term market and policy fluctuations have little effect on industry innovation strategies as the lead-
time for new product development is 10 to 15 years. However, the long term strategy for EU 
agricultural policy, moving towards improving competitiveness by lower support prices and 
protecting the rural environment, may have major implications for crop production in the EU and, 
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hence, for pesticide and seed markets. Policy instruments, such as cross-compliance and agri-
environmental programs, have an impact on pesticide use as they provide governments with direct 
means to control the environmental impact of farming methods. Seed companies significantly 
oriented towards European markets are most sensitive to these types of policy shifts, which alter the 
relative competitiveness of the location of production and lead to crop substitutions within a specific 
region. Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms will thus affect farmers’ crop choices as well as 
the intensity of the production systems. Despite the dynamics, producers of plant protection products 
and seeds look at shifts in farm policies as predictable changes. 
 
Regulation for the registration of pesticides, meant to protect human and environmental health, has 
become more stringent, making R&D for new pesticides more expensive. These higher costs 
reinforce the trend towards consolidation in the agrochemical industry as companies need a larger 
scale of operation to recoup the cost of registration and testing. According to Tait and Williams 
(1999), tightening risk regulation may even be beneficial to the large companies, as the prohibition of 
old chemicals provides an opportunity for new, more expensive products, and as the high cost of 
R&D and registration creates a barrier to entry. The companies in the PITA sample did not have any 
problem with the incremental changes in pesticide policies, which they consider of a predictable kind. 
 
Almost unanimously the greatest regulatory concern among company managers was the uncertainty 
surrounding the system for risk regulation of GM crops in Europe. Uncertainty about the regulatory 
system is severely inhibiting product development in the long run. Although the length of the product 
development cycle does give companies some protection against short-term uncertainty, the long-
term effect of current innovation choices makes the cost of wrong choices very high (potentially 
endangering the continuity of the company).  
 
This European problem has been seen as political rather than regulatory, and the solution has been 
seen to lie mainly in recovering a favorable public opinion for the industry and its products. To 
achieve this, companies have advocated more effective dialogue with a wider range of stakeholders 
than had been the case in the past. A second strategy suggested is a stronger focus on second 
generation GM crops, such as functional foods that are expected to have a greater publicly perceived 
benefits than the first generation GM crops (which are mainly associated with agronomic benefits). 
 
Changes in secondary markets (beyond the market for plant protection products and seeds) have 
forced the plant biotechnology industry to reconsider its interaction with various stakeholders. 
Traditionally, the farmer was the client of the agrochemical and seed company. Nowadays suppliers 
of inputs also have to take into account the demands of the food industry, the retail industry, and 
ultimately the consumer. With the shift of dominance to the end of the agrifood chain and with 
growing consumer concerns, innovation decision making in the agbiotech industry has become much 
more difficult. While posing serious constraints on conventional strategies, these changes also present 
opportunities for those companies that are able to mobilize stakeholders to collaborate in the 
development of crops with specific quality traits. This may generate more added value in the food 
chain.  
 
The difficulty in public acceptance of GM food products in Europe has already lead to further 
restructuring of the agbiotech industry. Most producers of plant protection products have been part of 
so-called life sciences companies. These firms use their knowledge of living organisms to produce 
seed and agrochemicals for plant production, veterinary products for animals, and diagnostic and 
therapeutic products for human health care. The basis of the life sciences strategy lies in the synergy 
effects of using biotechnological knowledge for various products and application. Several European 
agrochemical and pharmaceutical companies (Novartis, Zeneca, Hoechst/AgrEvo, Bayer and BASF) 
enthusiastically embraced this strategy.  
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However, in recent years doubts have been raised about the wisdom of bundling the various life 
science activities into one company (Bijman, 2001). From the marketing point of view the life science 
strategy is questioned because the markets for agricultural products and for health products are very 
different in size, in growth perspective, and in profitability. The markets for agrochemicals, as well as 
seeds are growing very slowly, if at all, while pharmaceutical markets are growing rapidly. The 
concerns of the European public about GM crops do not make the prospects of recouping the huge 
investments of agrochemical companies in biotechnology very promising.  Pharmaceutical companies 
may even consider it a liability to be involved in a business that encounters the degree of opposition 
aroused by GM crops. Novartis and AstraZeneca were the first to reconsider their life science 
strategy. In October 2000, they set their agribusiness activities (crop protection, seeds, and plant 
biotechnology) at arms’ length in the newly formed joint venture Syngenta.  Aventis will soon follow 
by divesting its Aventis CropScience. At the same time, BASF has sold its pharmaceuticals division 
in order to focus on (agro)chemicals and to increase investment in plant biotechnology. 
 
Conclusions 
 
European agbiotech companies have several loyalties: they have a national cultural background, they 
are dealing with European regulation, and they operate in a global market. National identities may 
still be important for those companies that generate most of their European turnover in their home 
country. This is particularly true for some of the German and French companies. National influences 
may also still be felt in the internal organization of the company, although most companies are now 
turning to a more international, project-based structure. Successful operation in Europe requires a 
large degree of sensitivity to European political and regulatory cultures, as well as an active 
stakeholder approach. While this need is unanimously acknowledged, companies find it very difficult 
to deal with the uncertainties. The long-term effects of current investment choices in both the 
agrochemical and seed industries, together with the uncertainties in regulation and public acceptance, 
make it very difficult for these companies to decide on innovation strategies. For companies operating 
on a world scale, challenges lie in how to deal with different regulatory regimes and different public 
perceptions in combination with the large cross-border product flows.  
 
Uncertainties in the regulation of GM crops are seen as the major challenge for the European 
agrobiotechnology companies. While low public acceptance of GM foods and long delays in 
regulatory decision making are interrelated, most companies see the solution in getting the regulatory 
process back on track. Companies now support a revision of the EU regulatory regime, including 
compulsory labeling, temporary registrations, and the need for closely monitoring GM crops. 
Moreover, companies acknowledge that developing those products that consumers will want to buy 
(i.e., developing second generation GM crops) will be the most effective route for regaining public 
confidence. 
 
The articles assembled in this issue show how the various European agrobiotechnology companies are 
dealing with the challenges posed by the market, by regulation, and by technology. While they face 
the same regulatory requirements, compete in the same markets, and are faced with the same 
technological opportunities, each company has its own unique set of innovation strategy decisions.  
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Endnotes 
 
1 1US$ = 1.08 Euro (in 2000). 
 
2 We have chosen to present the top 11 companies instead of the more common top 10 in order to 
show the position of Aventis (formerly AgrEvo). 
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